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Abstract
This contribution focuses on the comprehensive treatment of linguistic theory in a student 
classroom under particular regard of the formal vs. functional perspective. It focuses on 
the transparency of both paradigms concerning descriptive and explanatory adequacy 
and revises the results gained over several decades of work in the respective fi elds. Both 
paradigms will be sketched against the background of two relatively new contenders, 
Cognitive Linguistics (CL), which is largely functionally motivated, and Optimality 
Theory (OT), which is largely generative-formally motivated. This contribution tries 
to fi nd common ground between formal and functional linguistics with CL bridging the 
methodological gap. It thus aims at an integrative approach and introduces a notion of 
motivational adequacy.
1 Introduction
Linguistic phenomena are motivated by a set of universal initial conditions 
that are linked to two types of human endowment, the neuro-physiological and 
the cognitive endowment. Both are related to evolutionary steps and thus to 
processes mainly from the fi eld of evolutionary biology.
This makes sense for several reasons. The most important is the need for 
communication. A highly communicative species can be more successful than 
species who communicate less – thus the genetic traits of the former will be 
selected. Thus communication itself comes to be regarded as an evolutionary 
advantage: speakers talk things through when they plan something, mainly they 
talk to someone about something. This “aboutness” is the basis for the symbolic 
function of language, it makes humans the “symbolic species” (Deacon 1998).
Further, this observation leads to the assumption that communication is an 
adaptation to the pressure from the environment, with language representing 
a highly effi cient and successful way of communication. The processes of 
adaptation itself lead to certain observable phenomena in today’s natural language. 
However, the basic idea that links evolutionary past and the present usage of 
certain syntactic and morphological forms represents a modern way of thinking 
about language. Linguistics from both paradigms starts to adopt Neodarwinian 
ideas in the wake of especially Dawkins (2006) [1976] as evidenced by Hauser, 
Chomsky and Fitch (2002).
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Thus the necessity arises to integrate approaches from theoretical biology, 
especially from Neodarwinism with linguistic approaches. This does not make 
sense to everybody in the fi eld, especially linguists who do not know anything 
about biology and those biologists who do not know anything about linguistic 
theories. It is – and has been for a long time – possible to study linguistic 
phenomena under neglect of these motivational causes. 
Linguistics itself can be basically subdivided into approaches called 
reductionist and non-reductionist. It is not at all clear from the beginning where 
the evolutionary ideas tie in here: In reductionist approaches, large classes of 
phenomena can be explained with formulae as simple as possible unless leading 
to contradictions. Non-reductionist approaches elaborate phenomena and fi nd 
interrelations between them. Their disadvantage is that they are in principle not 
falsifi able. Falsifi ability, however, is a cornerstone of scientifi c research since 
the writings of Popper (cf. Popper 1959). The advantage of non-reductionism, 
however, is that it lends itself to a plausible description of a multitude of 
phenomena. This means that linguistics can legitimately be found in between 
both approaches. 
It follows naturally that reductionist approaches mostly relate to natural 
sciences whereas humanities often claim to deal with the non-reducible. The 















Table 1: Reductionism and non-reductionism in linguistics
2 Formal and functional linguistics and the evolutionary view
2.1 Lessons learned from the biological fi eld
In non-reductionist approaches, the functional approach leads researchers to 
ask what the function of a linguistic structure is in the same way as a botanist may 
look at a plant feature and ponder about its purpose. Descriptive linguistics, the 
study of traditional grammar, involves the listing of constructions (today usually 
taken from large corpora) and is by defi nition not a reductionist approach. The 
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formalisms involved lead to an often contradictory but superfi cial description of 
the usage of these constructions in language. They are therefore more important 
for language teaching.
As a fi eld in the middle, it is interesting to consider functionality within 
optimality. Looking for function is a reversal of the biological paradigm. 
What was the main occupation of biologists in the 19th century? In the wake of 
nomenclatural advances by Linnćus and others, biology was a descriptive science. 
Thus observing certain species/lexical items involved simply a description how 
certain species/lexical items behave, e.g. the environment of the individual/its 
collocation. This does not explain any reasons and therefore attains descriptive 
rather than explanatory adequacy. The shape of the beaks of fi nches on the 
Galápagos Islands inspired Darwin to recognize that this feature is not determined 
by its relation to other species but determined by its function. Different species 
show different features because these features have different functions. In that 
sense evolutionary biology is functional because every organ has its function, 
otherwise it would be an energetically costly appendage. The linguistic problem 
of today is that the idea of optimality arises from a reductionist approach but 
numerous examples show where optimality is functionally relevant.
2.2 Paradigm split in linguistic applications
In direct application the environmental pressure is creative in all examples 
derived from the fi elds of anthropological linguistics, the fi eld of eco-linguistics 
(cf. Mühlhäusler 1996, Fill 2001), modern approaches to pidgin and creole studies 
that portray them as adaptations to environmental pressures (cf. McWhorter 2001) 
– in all these the focus is on a functional relevance of forms. The linguistically 
interesting question is: How can the same explanatory instrument serve to yield 
explanatory adequacy in both linguistic paradigms. Traditionally, since the split 
into the Generative paradigm (1960s) and the emergence of a functional paradigm 
(1970s) there has been almost no communication between these two paradigms. 
Dissatisfi ed with the shortcomings of the then dominating paradigm (at least 
in North America) many well-known linguists jumped ship and went over to 
the functionalist side, generative grammarians such as Lakoff or Langacker 
(founder of Cognitive grammar). Today, it has become diffi cult for functionalist 
linguists to talk to generative linguists and the other way around. This poses 
problems for the teaching of linguistics: either follow leading schools or inspire 
critical thinking about both approaches. This thinking, however, needs support 
in that both approaches should be taught as complementary, not as opposites. 
Optimistically, we can try and reconcile certain ideas that are prevalent in those 
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fi elds and fi nd evidence for that. Especially grammarians trained in both traditions 
show surprising insight: Langacker quipped in 1977 (1977: 102):
 I believe we can isolate a number of broad categories of linguistic optimality. 
Languages  will end to change so as to maximize optimality in each of these 
categories [...]. The tendencies toward these various types of optimality will often 
confl ict with one another (quoted from Haspelmath 1999).
This enlightened comment was written many years before Optimality Theory 
was founded (1993 by Prince and Smolensky). The common core idea of formal 
and functional linguistics here is: 
a) languages change in order to adapt 
b) this change leads to greater optimality (maximize optimality)
c) types of optimality will confl ict with one another
Langacker’s idea is far-reaching because it presupposes constraints. We 
cannot have optimality in all features, syntactic and semantic, so there will 
be constraints. We know further that constraints will confl ict with each other; 
therefore a ranking of constraints is necessary. We thus have evidence that formal 
and functional linguistics fi t together bracketed by the idea of optimality.
3  The benefi ts of Optimality theory
Optimality Theory (OT) is a natural extension of Generative Theory in the 
same way as Generative Theory is compatible to formal semantics. The theoretical 
problem in Generative Theory lies in the way that it proposes a grammar that 
encompasses all expressions of a language. This means that grammarians need 
to fi nd a way to separate the expressions that belong to the language from those 
that do not. This could be imagined as a combination of a generative grammar 
that overgenerates expressions and a fi lter that eliminates unwanted expressions 
(Archangeli & Langedoen 1997: ii). The advantage of OT is that it proposes that 
the Universal Grammar (UG) from Generative Theory contains sets of violable 
constraints in which each language has its own ranking of these constraints. Thus 
the differences in ranking generate systematic variation between languages. The 
constraints persist on all levels of linguistic description – phonology, morphology, 
and syntax – and across all these levels. Constraints can be violated in order to 
satisfy a higher ranked constraint. The optimal candidate has the fewest, lowest 
number of violations and the only violation is that of the lowest ranking constraint. 
Therefore, OT proposes an input, an output and a relationship between the two, 
similar to Generative Theory (Archangeli & Langedoen 1997: 14), cf. sicken.
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Table 2: Constraint tableau for a simple phonological rule
In any optimality tableau we fi nd a number of constraints so that by 
calculating them, we fi nd a short formula for certain linguistic form that is either 
phonological or morphological. 
3.1 Rules vs. constraints
In Generative grammar, rules describe the mapping between phonological 
representation and phonetic form. OT replaced rules with a hierarchy of ranked, 
violable constraints; however, both have the same goal: the description of 
linguistic competence. A simple example is the English plural formation: In 
a proposed mental phonological representation, the basic shape is /-z/ which 
has different allophones in cats /-s/, dogs /-z/ and horses /-əz/. A constraint is 
that sequences of obstruents must have the same value for voicing. A way to 




epenthesis - - /hrs#əz/
devoicing /kæt#s/ - -
phonetic form [kæts] [dgz] [hsəz]
Table 3: Plural formation in English (adapted from Anderson & Lightfoot 2002: 98)
The English plural formation tableau relies on the input to have the root and 
the plural morpheme always in voiced form. Several simple constraints help 
explain that. Cf. the following four constraints (based on Haspelmath 1999):
SAMEVOICE:  Sequences of obstruents within a syllable must agree for voicing 
OCP(SIBILANT):  Sequences of sibilants are prohibited within the word 
DEPIO: Insertion of segments is prohibited 
IDENTITY(VOICE):  Input and output are identical for voicing
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Several of these constraints correspond well with evolutionary principles: 
In the SAMEVOICE the voicing agreement shows that an unmotivated change in 
voicing is unnecessarily costly. In DEPIO the insertion of segments is prohibited 
because something cannot be optimal when we have to bring in new lexical 
material to supply our linguistic form. This goes against the faithfulness constraint 
that says that anything that appears in the input has to be the output. To add 
something like an epenthetic element (e.g. a schwa) to the segment represents an 
additional effort. It is thus more optimal not to bring it in, but to work with what 
we have in the input (cf. Table 4).













Table 4: Constraint tableau for the English plural (adapted from Haspelmath 1999)
This is also the principle of the IDENTITY(VOICE) constraint. Two constraints 
will be violated when we assume that the underlying consonant from the 
phonological input representation is voiced. Several constraints are critically 
violated by the same voice constraints, thus there is no solution like /kætəz/. The 
schwa is also not inserted in /dgz/ which makes dogs the most optimal solution: 
It resembles very closely the input, it follows that input and output are nearly 
identical here. /dg-s/ is ruled out due to the effort of producing a sequence of 
a voiced velar stop and a voiceless sibilant. If these constraints hold, then there 
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must be a way to formulate a constraint, so that not only the optimality theoretic 
approach is satisfi ed, but also that we explain it in a sort of functional framework. 
Two sibilants together are diffi cult to produce, so it will be functionally relevant 
not to have two sibilants together, which is evidenced by the impossibility of 
/hrsz/. However, this is an evolutionary explanation that is inherently compatible 
with functional rather than formal linguistics.
4  Towards an integrational account on functionality within OT
4.1 A unifi cation of explanatory adequacy
The focus in this paragraph will be on constraints and their parallel 
interpretations, i.e. their interpretation in an ‘optimality’ way and in a functional 
way. The latter represents a reinterpretation, largely suggested by the insightful 
paper by Haspelmath (1999). He discusses the MAXLEX constraint which says 
that vowel elision typically does not affect roots and content words. He then 
ventures two alternative explanations. The Optimality Theory explanation by 
Casali: “[this] arises from a more general functional motivation, a preference for 
maintaining phonological material belonging to elements that typically encode 
greater semantic content” (Casali 1997 as quoted in Haspelmath 1999). What is 
functional about this? In OT terms, this explanation is very functional, only that it 
does not get to the core of functionality, which is a sort of motivational adequacy. 
It is formal within being functional in the sense that less or more semantic content 
is encoded. When we attempt to maintain phonological material that encodes 
rather more than less semantic content, then it will contrast with items that have 
less semantic content. This creates a hierarchy of semantic content from where it 
seems obvious that greater semantic content is advantageous, thus more optimal 
and more relevant than words with less semantic content. This can be tested 
easily by looking at any sentence and leaving out either all the function words 
(which have less semantic content) or all the content words (which have more of 
it). It can be shown that when leaving out all the content words (nouns, verbs) it is 
impossible to extract meaningful sense out of the sentence. This is also supported 
by data from psycholinguistic research that found evidence for an incremental 
buildup of meaning (cf. Gorrell 2001: 748). Greater semantic content supports 
communication, therefore highly packaged content is an adaptation to optimal 
communication. Further, it is an adaptation not to distort the phonological 
material belonging to elements with greater semantic content. This is the reason 
why it has to be maintained. 
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Haspelmath (1999) considers formal explanations of this type as “vacuous” 
because they give no causality whatsoever for the advantages that justify the 
existence of constraints of this type. Instead, his simple reinterpretation of MAXLEX 
is as follows: Preserving phonological material of elements with greater semantic 
content helps the hearer to identify the most important parts of a discourse. When 
we destroy the part of semantic information and the items that have greater 
semantic value, then the listener loses central parts of the communication. This 
hinders effi cient communication. Therefore it is functionally not optimal and 
thus in OT would violate high-ranking constraints. It is the same explanation 
that is given for a formal and a functional approach. Explanatory adequacy is 
identical in both paradigms.
4.2 General constraints revisited
To continue the approach taken in the previous paragraph, any formal 
expression in language should then be motivated by functional criteria which 
are evolutionary and subject to change. Cf. the functional interpretation of the 
SAMEVOICE constraint: Obstruent sequences with different phonation types are 
diffi cult to perceive because a voicing contrast is not salient in an obstruent 
environment. Salient means it does not stick out for the perceiver in an obstruent 
environment. Consider a sequence where there are two obstruents that differ in 
voicing: In any phonetic environment the difference between the two segments 
would never be discriminatory because it cannot be perceived. It is impossible to 
hear the glottis move from open to close between the two stop sounds. Therefore, 
the difference between voiceless and voiced segments in an obstruent environment 
is not salient. The hearer will not hear it. If something is not salient, then there is 
no need for language to encode it. Language encodes only structures that people 
can perceive; therefore it violates optimality if these sequences would exist. For 
general constraints the same explanations apply. For Grimshaw’s STAY (Grimshaw 
1997): “Do not move”, the functional explanation is not that input and output 
differ: this is rather an effect but it is not an explanation. The explanation is that 
leaving material in canonical position helps the hearer to identify grammatical 
relations and reducing its processing costs of the speaker. E.g. placing prepositions 
before nouns in operator-operand languages leaves the lexical elements in situ 
under infl uence of STAY: Any movement would increase our processing costs. 
By moving we fi nd the material in non-canonical positions (without expecting 
it). This leaves additional processing load in order to decode it. Any unnecessary 
processing is disadvantageous and hence not optimal. There is a clear evolutionary 
explanation by way of a psychological explanation. Haspelmath (1999) offers a 
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similar reinterpretation of Pesetzky’s TELEGRAPH constraint which says, “Do not 
pronounce function words” (ibid.: 191). As demonstrated above, the diminutive 
value of function words for the message actually favors their neglect. Leaving 
out function words thus reduces pronunciation costs for the speaker in a way that 
is “minimally disruptive for understanding by the hearer” (ibid.) and the message 
remains somehow understandable.
5 Conclusion
To conclude from the evidence presented above: the formal paradigm (in 
the gestalt of OT) collects evidence in hierarchies of constraints, the functional 
side adds a plausible evolutionary or cognitive explanation that is a refl ection of 
palaeoanthropological selection mechanisms. This means for teaching linguistics 
that students should be familiarized with both sides and the modern view on their 
complementarity. 
In a famous quote, Theodosius Dobzhansky remarked that “nothing in biology 
makes sense except in the light of evolution” (Dobzhansky 1973). As could be 
shown, language as a highly specifi ed adaptation is part of human biology in 
which speakers follow heuristics of their primate ancestors. Even the diachronic 
relationship between earlier and later stages in a language (e.g. abandoning 
overmarking in Early Modern English which is a costly redundancy) makes 
sense in the light of evolution. It could not be in any other way.
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